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Despite the fact that one-third of worldwide mergers involve firms from different countries, the vast
majority of the academic literature on mergers studies domestic mergers.  What little has been written
about cross-border mergers has focused on public firms, usually from the United States.  Yet, the vast
majority of cross-border mergers involve private firms that are not from the United States.  We provide
an analysis of a sample of 56,978 cross-border mergers occurring between 1990 and 2007.  We first
characterize the patterns of who buys whom: Geography matters, with firms being much more likely
to purchase firms in nearby countries than in countries far away.  Purchasers are usually but not always
from developed countries and they tend to purchase firms in countries with lower investor protection
and accounting standards.  A significant factor in determining acquisition patterns is currency movements;
firms tend to purchase firms from countries relative to which the acquirer’s currency has appreciated.
In addition economy-wide factors reflected in the country’s stock market returns lead to acquisitions
as well.  Both the currency and stock market effect could reflect either misvaluation or wealth explanations.
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1.  Introduction. 
The volume of cross-border acquisitions has been growing worldwide, from 30 percent of the 
total merger volume in 1998 to 45 percent in 2007.  Some of these cross-border mergers occur for 
exactly the same reasons as domestic mergers, e.g., synergies, market power, and/or managerial 
preferences. Yet, in an international context, there are a number of additional factors, such as cross-
country differences in macroeconomic conditions, legal regimes, political systems, culture, 
regulatory environments, and tax systems, that could affect cross-border mergers.
1   One particularly 
important factor in international merger decisions is valuation differences between acquiring and 
target firms.  Differences in valuation between potential acquirers and targets have been documented 
to be one motive for domestic mergers.
2 These valuation differences are likely to be even more 
important in an international context since movements in country-level stock markets and currencies 
provide additional sources of valuation differences. 
This paper considers the extent to which valuation differences and other international factors 
motivate cross-border mergers and acquisitions.  Valuation differences between acquirers and targets 
can be broken into three components:  Differences in country-level stock market movements, 
differences in firm-specific stock price movements relative to country-level indices, or appreciation 
or depreciation of the currencies in which acquirers’ and targets’ securities are traded. Each of these 
components potentially reflects an alternative source of valuation difference that could motivate 
                                                 
1 The extent to which a number of these factors explain cross-border mergers has been explored in previous work.  
In particular, Graham and Krugman (1995) summarize earlier literature on macroeconomic conditions; Dewenter 
(1995) and Froot and Stein (1991) examine relative wealth effects; Rossi and Volpin (2004) examine why corporate 
governance proxied by legal regimes can affect cross-border M&A patterns; Chakrabarti, Jayaraman and Gupta-
Mukherjee (2005) find that culture disparity leads to better outcome in cross-border M&As;  Desai, Foley and Hines 
(2004) find that US multinationals move capital toward low-tax locations.  
2 See Shleifer and Vishny (2003), Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004), Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson and Teoh 
(2006), and Harford (2005).    2
mergers.  We estimate the effect of these factors on merger propensities using a sample of 56,978 
cross-border mergers occurring between 1990 and 2007.   
In contrast to most of the prior literature that focuses on mergers of public acquirers and 
targets involving U.S. firms, our sample better reflects the universe of cross-border mergers, the 
majority of which involve private firms, mostly from outside of the U.S.   In our sample, 80% of 
completed cross-border deals between 1990 and 2007 targeted a non-US firm, while 75% did not 
involve a US firm as an acquirer. The majority of acquirers (90%) are from “developed” countries, 
while the other 10% being from “developing” countries.  A surprisingly large number of cross-border 
transactions involve firms in Eastern Europe (2,115 deals), Asia (7,009 deals), South America (2,587 
deals), Africa (853 deals), Central America (810 deals), and Middle East (617 deals).  Furthermore, 
the vast majority of cross-border mergers involve private firms as either bidder or target:  96% of the 
deals involve a private target, 26% involve a private acquirer, and 97% have either private acquirers 
or targets.   Hence, the inclusion of private firms in our analysis is important, especially since most 
other studies use samples of publicly-traded firms or lump private acquisitions in with other 
investments as foreign direct investment (FDI).  
Our results suggest that valuation differences between acquirers and targets significantly 
affect the likelihood of a cross-border merger.  The cross-border acquirer is more likely to be from a 
country whose currency has appreciated relative to the target’s currency and whose country’s stock 
market has outperformed the target firm’s country’s market.  In addition, if the companies are public, 
the acquirer’s firm-specific abnormal performance is likely to be better than the target’s.  The 
estimated effects are fairly large: Our estimates imply that a 100% difference in country-level stock 
returns between two countries leads to a 17.4% increase in the expected number of acquisitions of the 
worse performing country’s firms by the better-performing country’s firms.  Similarly, a 75% 
appreciation of one country’s currency relative to another’s leads to a 50.4% increase in the number 
of acquisitions of firms in countries with relatively depreciated currency.   3
Differences in valuation can affect merger propensities through two main channels.  Froot 
and Stein (1991) argue that differences in wealth that occur because of exchange rate or other shocks 
provide a financing advantage, lowering the cost of a potential acquisition.  A wealthier country 
effectively has a lower cost of capital, leading its firms to purchase assets outside the country, 
including other companies. More generally, international acquisitions provide a way in which newly 
wealthier shareholders can increase their exposure internationally without purchasing foreign stocks. 
In addition, valuations can drive mergers if these valuations diverge from fundamentals (see 
Shleifer and Vishny (2003), Dong et al. (2006), Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004), and Baker, 
Foley and Wurgler (2009)).  Given misvaluation, managers of a relatively overvalued firm will have 
incentives to purchase relatively undervalued assets, especially if they can use their overvalued 
stocks as a means of payment.  In an international context this divergence from fundamentals could 
occur for two reasons:  First, overall investor sentiment could vary across countries, creating a wedge 
in firm values in the local-currency across countries.  Second, the currencies in which the companies 
are valued can appreciate or depreciate more than is warranted by changes in underlying economic 
conditions, leading the companies to be relatively misvalued.  
We focus on measures of relative valuation between bidders and targets at the country level, 
and, when possible, at the firm level.  We consider the relative stock market performance of the 
countries of the acquiring and target firms prior to the mergers, broken up into local currency and 
exchange rate components.  We also analyze a country-level ‘market-to-book’ measure, similar to 
that used by Baker et al. (2009).  Further, we examine the relative firm-level stock performance as 
well as the market-to-book ratios of the subsample of mergers between public acquirers and targets. 
Based on univariate comparisons of pre-merger performance between bidders and targets, 
acquirers outperform targets by all measures.  The local-currency return of the acquirer is 0.3% 
higher during the 12 months, 0.92% the 24 months, and 2.12% during the 36 months before the deal 
occurs.  Similarly, the exchange rate of the acquirer tends to appreciate relative to that of the target   4
before the deal, 1.12%, 2.13% and 3.43% in the 12, 24 and 36 months prior to the mergers, 
respectively.  Given these results, not surprisingly, the market-to-book ratio of the acquirers’ 
countries is 9.93% higher at the time of the deal.  This pattern is true for both private and public 
acquirers and targets.   
When we restrict ourselves to public acquirers and targets so that we can compare the firm-
level returns, we again find that acquirers outperform targets prior to the acquisitions.  The difference 
in local-currency returns is 10.38%, 19.34%, and 23.36% for 12, 24 and 36 months prior to the 
acquisition, respectively.  In addition, the average market to book ratio is higher for acquirers than 
for targets, mirroring for what has previously been documented for U.S. domestic acquisitions (see 
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004)). 
We next evaluate the possibility that valuation could motivate cross-border mergers in a 
multivariate context.  We first estimate models predicting the number of deals in a particular country-
pair as a function of relative market conditions in the two countries.  We find that differences in local 
currency returns as well as exchange rate returns predict the volume of mergers between particular 
country pairs.  In addition, differences in country-level market to book ratios predict cross-border 
merger volume as well.  These findings are consistent with the view that the difference in valuation is 
an important driver of cross-border merger activity. 
We consider the types of mergers for which stock-market and currency valuation differences 
appear to be the most important motives.  Our results suggest that currency movements predict 
mergers mostly for within-region country-pairs and also appear to be most important when the 
acquiring country is wealthier than the target.  This pattern is consistent with the view that firms in 
wealthier countries purchase firms in poorer nearby countries because they are relatively inexpensive 
following currency depreciation. We also find that valuation differences in country-level stock 
market predict mergers mostly when the acquiring country is wealthier than the target, consistent   5
with the view that firms in wealthier countries purchase foreign firms following a decline in the 
poorer country’s stock market. 
There are two potential (though not mutually exclusive) explanations for the stock-return 
differences between acquirer and targets prior to the acquisitions. First, the returns can affect changes 
in the relative wealth of the two countries. Second, the returns can reflect differential divergence 
from fundamentals.  We use an approach suggested by Baker et al. (2009) to differentiate the two 
explanations.  In particular, we estimate an equation predicting a country’s market to book ratio using 
future returns.  Baker et al. (2009) suggest that the fitted values from such a regression should reflect 
overvaluation while the residuals reflect a wealth effect.  We find evidence consistent with the wealth 
effect, which is strong in magnitude and persistent across different sub-samples, rather than the 
mispricing effect. 
We then examine at the deal level whether valuation differences drive cross-border M&As 
controlling for firm-specific factors. We find that differences in US dollar firm returns predict higher 
likelihood of cross-border deals compared to domestic deals. Furthermore, when we decompose 
valuation differences between acquiring and target firms to three components, we find that acquiring 
firms in cross-border mergers outperform their domestic capital market.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows:  Section 2 discusses the previous literature 
on cross-country mergers, including some relevant papers on FDI.  Section 3 describes the data.  
Section 4 presents the results while Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Prior literature on Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions 
Despite the fact that a large proportion of worldwide merger activity involves firms from 
different countries, the voluminous literature on mergers has focused almost exclusively on domestic   6
deals.
3  While this literature also helps to understand international mergers, it does not address a 
number of factors related to country-based differences between firms.  Nonetheless, there has been 
some work on cross-border mergers, which tends to either lump together mergers with other 
international investments as FDI or to analyze only mergers between public firms. 
Much of earlier work has focused on synergies, marketing ability, or technological 
advantages to explain why a foreign firm would value domestic assets more highly than would a 
domestic firm (see Graham and Krugman (1995) for a summary). Other factors including relative 
labor costs and tax incentives have been used to explain the general pattern that FDI flows from 
developed to less developed countries (e.g. Cushman (1987) and Swenson (1989)).  
However, none of these studies provide theoretical justification for a relation between 
currency movements and cross-border mergers or other components of FDI.  Froot and Stein (1991) 
suggest one such story, in which wealth effects matter because information problems in financial 
contracting cause external financing to be more costly than internal financing. When a firm’s value 
increases, so does its access to capital relative to alternative bidders whose value did not increase by 
as much.  Consequently, when a potential foreign acquirer’s value increases, for example through 
unhedged exchange rate changes or stock market fluctuations, then the potential foreign acquirer can 
bid more aggressively for domestic assets than domestic rival bidders can do.  In equilibrium, relative 
value changes lead to an increase in cross-border acquisitions by firms in the relatively wealthy 
country. The prediction that FDI increases following exchange rate movements has been tested by 
Klein and Rosengren (1994), Dewenter (1995), Klein, Peek and Rosengren (2002), and Desai, Foley 
and Forbes (2009), all of whom focus on FDI inflows and outflows from the United States.  
A different reason for the relation between price levels and mergers is that cross-border 
mergers are caused by the mispricing of stocks. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) develop a model in 
                                                 
3 See Jensen and Ruback (1983), Jarrell, Brickley and Netter (1988) or Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001) for 
surveys.     7
which overvaluation can lead to mergers.   In their model, managers of an overvalued acquirer issue 
shares at inflated prices to buy less-overpriced assets.  This transaction transfers value to the 
shareholders of the acquiring firm by arbitraging the price difference between the acquiring firm’s 
stock price and fundamentals. Their model seems particularly applicable in an international setting, 
since differences in valuation are likely to occur because of either exchange rate or stock price 
movements.  Using a sample of U.S. domestic mergers, Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson and Viswanathan 
(2005) provide empirical support for the implications of this theory.  
Baker et al. (2009) provide a direct test of the Froot and Stein (1991) wealth hypothesis and 
the Shleifer and Vishny (2003) mispricing hypothesis.  These authors consider the way in which 
relative price levels affect FDI inflows and outflows to the United States.  An important issue in this 
analysis is the fact that most FDI purchases are of real assets or private companies, which are not 
directly affected by stock price valuations.  Baker et al. (2009) argue that the mispricing channel 
could nonetheless operate, even without new public equity issuances. If overvalued equity reduces 
the cost of debt by its effects on perceived collateral values and through widely-used credit-rating 
models, then an overpriced stock market could increase private firms’ access to capital.  Using data 
on U.S. FDI, Baker et al. (2009) find support for both the wealth and mispricing hypotheses.  
Until recently, few studies use deal-level analysis to examine factors that affect the intensity 
and pattern of cross-border M&As.  Rossi and Volpin (2004) construct country-pair samples based 
on deals involving public firms and find that differences in investor protection affect the incidence of 
cross-border deals.  Firms in countries with weaker protection tend to be targets of firms from 
countries with stronger protection, presumably because the better investor protection provides an 
incremental source of value.
4   Ferreira, Massa and Matos (2009) also focus on public firms involved 
in cross-border M&A deals. These authors find that foreign institutional ownership is positively 
associated with the intensity of cross-border M&A activity worldwide, which could occur for a 
                                                 
4 See also Bris and Cabolis (2008) and Martynova and Renneboog (2008) for related findings.   8
number of reasons, including foreign ownership facilitating the transfer, foreign ownership being 
correlated with more professionally managed companies, or foreign owners being more likely to sell 
to foreign buyers than local owners. 
  
3.  Data 
Our analysis is based on Security Data Corporation’s (SDC) Mergers and Corporate 
Transactions database for data on mergers and acquisitions announced between 1990 and 2007 and 
completed by the end of 2007. We exclude LBOs, spin-offs, recapitalizations, self-tender offers, 
exchange offers, repurchases, partial equity stake purchases, acquisitions of remaining interest, and 
privatizations, as well as deals in which the target or the acquirer is a government agency, or in the 
financial or utilities industry.
5  We end up with 187,841 mergers with the total transaction value 
equal to $7.54 trillion, 56,978 of which are cross-border with total transaction value equal to $2.21 
trillion. 
We obtain data on monthly firm-level and country-level stock returns, as well as exchange 
rate quotes from Datastream.
6  We then deflate these return indices using the 1990 constant consumer 
price index (CPI) and calculate real returns for stocks in both local currency and U.S. dollars.
7  When 
calculating real returns for E.U. countries, we use the Euro as the currency (for the E.U. firms 
adopting it) after 1999 and deflate it using corresponding E.U. CPI. For country-level market-equity-
to-book-equity ratio, we follow Fama and French (1998) and sum the market value of all firms within 
a country, normalized by the sum of book values for the same firms.  
                                                 
5 We only include countries which have consistent stock market data during 1990 and 2007. The number (value) of 
deals dropped due to lack of information on stock market return is 4,061 ($145 billion), approximately 2% (1.9%) of 
the sample. 
6 Since U.K. has the widest Datastream coverage for the quoted exchange rates, we use National Exchange Rates for 
the U.K. and manually convert these currency quotes to get the quotes for the U.S. 
7  For Australia and New Zealand, we only have quarterly price level. When extrapolating to monthly level 
information using Natural (or simple) Spline Fitting method (to smooth out the prices), we assume that the price 
level represents the end of month/quarter.   9
We use various data sources for country-level controls. We obtain each country’s legal origin 
as well as proxies for the level of investor protection (the “Rule of Law” and “Anti-director Rights 
variables) from La Porta et al. (LLSV, 1998), ratings on the disclosure of accounting information 
reported by the Center for International Financial Analysis and Research, and a newly assembled 
anti-self dealing index from Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2007). We also 
include culture variables: language (English, Spanish or others) and religion (Protestant, Catholic, 
Muslim, Buddhist or Others) from Stulz and Williamson (2003). We obtain annual Gross National 
Product (in US Dollars) normalized by population and annual real growth rate of the Gross Domestic 
Product from the World Development Indicator report.  
For the public firms in our M&A sample, we obtain accounting and ownership information 
from Worldscope.  In particular, Worldscope provides firm-level data on firm size (book value of 
total assets), book leverage (long-term debt divided by total assets), cash ratio (cash holdings divided 
by total assets), two-year geometric sales growth, and return on equity as well as the market-to-book 
ratio of the equity. 
 
4.  Results 
4.1.  Stylized Facts about Cross-Border Mergers. 
  Mergers involving acquirers and targets from different countries are substantial, both in terms 
of absolute number, and the value of deals as a fraction of worldwide M&A activity.  Panel A of 
Figure 1 plots the quantity of cross-border deals over our sample period.  As with domestic deals, the 
volume of cross-border mergers increases throughout the 1990s, declines after the stock market crash 
of 2000, and increases again between 2003 and 2007.  Panel B plots the quantity and value of cross-
border deals as a fraction of total deals.  Cross-border mergers are typically between 20 and 40 
percent of worldwide merger volume. The fraction of cross-border deals also follows the overall   10
level of the stock market; the fraction drops in the early 1990s, increases in the later 1990s to a peak 
in 2000, and then increases again with the stock market between 2003 and 2007. 
  One fact that is clearly evident is that most cross-border mergers do not involve U.S. firms.  
Figure 2 graphs the fraction of U.S. acquirers and targets over time, both weighting each deal equally 
and by deal size. In most years, between 12 and 28 percent of acquirers are from the U.S. and 
between 20 and 37 percent of the targets are from the U.S.  When we weigh by deal size, the fraction 
of U.S. deals grows somewhat but still the overwhelming majority of deals do not involve U.S. firms.  
Table 1 characterizes the pattern of cross-country acquisitions in our sample. The columns 
represent the countries of the acquiring companies while the rows represent those of the target 
companies.  The diagonal entries of the matrix are therefore the number domestic mergers for a 
particular country and the off-diagonal entries are the number of deals in a particular country pair.  
The totals exclude domestic mergers and hence represent the number of cross-border mergers to and 
from a particular country.  The country with the largest number of acquisitions is the U.S.; U.S. firms 
were acquirers in 15,034 cross-border mergers and were targets in 11,886 mergers, which is 
substantial but certainly do not represent the majority of the 56,978 cross-border mergers. 
  A casual glance at Table 1 indicates that geography clearly matters.  Domestic mergers are by 
far the largest in number for all countries.  Of the cross-border mergers, there is a large tendency to 
purchase companies in nearby countries.  For example, of the 226 cross-border acquisitions by New 
Zealand companies, about two-thirds, 145, were Australian companies.  By far the largest target of 
Hong Kong based companies were Chinese companies (214 of 633 cross-border acquisitions of Hong 
Kong companies), and aside from the U.S., the vast majority of German cross-border acquisitions 
were from other European companies. 
  Table 2 characterizes the target firms by country, documenting the numbers that are bought 
by domestic firms, foreign firms, and the industry breakdown of these firms.  This table indicates that 
the domestic/cross-border breakdown varies substantially across countries.  In large countries there   11
tends to be many more domestic targets than cross-border ones; for example in the U.S., the number 
of U.S. firms that are targets of cross-border acquisitions is only about 15% of the targets of the 
domestic ones.  In contrast, in a number of smaller countries there are actually more cross-border 
targets than domestic ones.  This pattern is not surprising since there are more potential domestic 
acquirers in large countries than in small ones. 
4.2.  Cross-Sectional Determinants of Cross-Border Mergers 
  To analyze the cross-sectional patterns among acquirers and targets formally, we use a 
multivariate regression framework.  We consider all (ordered) country pairs, and construct a variable 
that equals the number of acquisitions by firms in one country of firms in the second at any point 
during the sample period, normalized by the total number of domestic acquisitions in the target 
country. This variable provides a measure of the propensity of firms of one country to acquire firms 
of another one.  In a similar fashion, we construct the intensities of cross-border deals separately 
using only public target and acquirers and private target and acquirers. 
We then estimate equations predicting this variable as a function of the characteristics of the 
countries. Since each observation is a “country pair”, the total number of observations is the square 
of the number of observations minus the number of observations (37×36
 = 1332). We include the 
stock return difference of the country indices (average annual local real stock market return) and the 
relative appreciation of the two countries’ currencies (the average annual real exchange rate return) 
over the entire sample period because, as we have argued above, changes in relative valuation are 
likely to lead to acquisitions. Regulatory and legal differences between countries are potential causes 
of cross-border acquisitions (Rossi and Volpin (2004)), so we include the difference in the LLSV 
measures of accounting quality (an index created by the Center for International Financial Analysis 
and Research to rate the quality of 1990 annual reports on their disclosure of accounting information) 
and legal protection (the product of the “Rule of Law” and “Anti-director Rights” variables). To 
capture the regional effect discussed above, we include the distance between the capital cities of a   12
country pair.
8  To evaluate if a common culture makes mergers more likely, we include variables 
indicating whether the target and acquirer’s primary religion, are the same and whether their primary 
language (English, Spanish or others) are the same (Stulz and Williamson (2003)). To reflect the 
differences in wealth between any pair of countries as well as the change in this difference, we 
include the difference in the log of gross national product in 1990 (in US dollars) divided by the 
population and the average annual real growth rate of the gross domestic product from 1990 to 2007 
(source: WDI report). Finally, each equation contains dummies for each country (so that each 
observation has two dummy variables, one of the acquirer and one for the target country).
9     
Table 3 contains estimates of this equation.  There are a number of patterns among acquirers 
and targets.  First, the regional effect discussed above is evident; holding other things constant, being 
closer to one another substantially increases the likelihood that there are acquisitions between two 
countries.  Second, there is a currency effect.  Firms from countries whose currencies appreciated 
over the sample period tended to be purchasers of firms whose currency tended to depreciate.  Third, 
consistent with Rossi and Volpin (2004), having a better legal protection of minority shareholders’ 
rights and having higher quality accounting disclosure system each increase the likelihood that firms 
from a country will be purchasers of firms from another country.  Finally the likelihood that a firm 
from one country purchases a firm from another increases when the two countries share a common 
language.  There is no evidence that sharing a common religion has any impact on merger 
propensities. 
                                                 
8 We obtain latitude and longitude of capital cities of each country from 
http://www.mapsofworld.com/utilities/world-latitude-longitude.htm. We then apply the standard formula: 3963.0 * 
arcos [sin(lat1) *  sin(lat2) + cos (lat1) * cos (lat2) * cos (lon2 - lon1)], where lon and lat are the longitudes and 
latitudes of the acquirer and the target country locations, respectively.  
9 We have also estimated equations similar to those in Table 3 including bilateral trade flow calculated as the value 
of imports by destination country from origin country as a percentage of total imports by destination country 
(source: United Nation Commodity Trade database).  The idea of including this variable is that trade flow is likely to 
be related to the amount of business done between two countries and consequently the synergistic motives for 
mergers.  The results from this specification are similar to those reported below except that the coefficient on the 
trade variable is positive and statistically significant.  We do not include this variable because it is not available for 
roughly 15% of the country pairs in our sample.   13
4.3.  Differences in Valuation Using Country-Level Panel Data: Univariate Evidence 
  Table 4 summarizes the valuation differences between acquirers and targets.  As measures of 
valuation, we report differences in market to book, differences in exchange rate returns, and 
differences in local-currency stock returns prior to the acquisition, both at the country and firm levels.  
We report the country-level stock returns, the firm-level stock returns, and currency returns each for 
1, 2 and 3 years intervals prior to the acquisition.   
  The first column presents these return differences for the entire sample of cross-border 
mergers.  For both the level of valuation (the market to book ratio) and the recent change in valuation 
(both through local stock market returns and by change in the exchange rate), acquirers are valued 
higher than targets.  The market-to-book ratio averages almost 10% higher for acquiring countries 
than for target countries.  In addition, the average local stock market returns are higher for acquiring 
firm countries than target firm countries, by 0.3% in the first year before the merger, 0.92% in the 
two years prior to the merger and by 2.12% over the three years prior to the merger.  Finally, the 
exchange rate of acquiring companies appreciates relative to that of the target companies, by 1.12% 
in the year prior the acquisition, by 2.13% in the two years and 3.43% of the three years prior to the 
acquisition.  All these results are consistent with the view that firms purchase firms when they are 
relatively highly valued, either because of a wealth effect or to take advantage of overvaluation. 
  For the subsample of mergers for which the acquirers and targets are both publicly traded and 
hence have observable stock returns, acquirers substantially outperform targets prior to the 
acquisitions.  The differences are much larger than the country-level differences, about 10% in the 
year prior to the acquisition, 19% in the two-year period prior to the acquisition and 23% in the three-
year period prior to the acquisition.  This relation is again consistent with the valuation arguments 
and similar to what others have found for domestic acquisitions (see Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan 
(2004), Dong et al. (2006), and Harford (2005)).   14
  This pattern can be clearly seen in Panel A of Figure 3. Prior to month 0, the month of the 
acquisition, both the local currency return and exchange rate return differences are positive, meaning 
that the acquirer’s country’s stock market outperformed the target’s and that the acquirer’s currency 
appreciated relative to the targets during the 3 years prior to the acquisition.  Subsequent to the 
acquisition, however, the local currency return difference disappears, meaning that the target country 
outperforms the acquirer’s during the 3 years subsequent to the acquisition.  However, the acquirer’s 
currency continues to appreciate, leaving the common-currency returns in the two countries’ stock 
markets approximately the same following the acquisitions. 
  We break down the pre-acquisition returns by characteristics of the deals in the remaining 
columns of Table 4.  The second through fifth columns consider deals by whether the acquirer and 
target are from developing or developed countries, using the World Bank definition of “high income” 
economies.
10  The pre-acquisition local return differences are positive for each category although 
they are substantially larger when a developed acquirer buys a developed target and when a 
developing acquirer buys a developed target (12.79% and 9.54% differences for the two categories 
for the three years prior to the acquisition).  However the currency movements prior to the deal go in 
opposite directions for these two categories. When a developing acquirer buys a developed target the 
acquirer’s currency actually depreciates prior to the acquisition. On the other hand, when a developed 
acquirer buys a developing target, it generally follows a period of strong relative appreciation.  This 
pattern could reflect a general appreciation of developed currencies relative to developing ones over 
our sample period and suggests that we should control for these effects econometrically (as we do 
below). 
                                                 
10  It is not obvious how one should define countries as developing or developed. We have used alternative 
definitions of developing and developed and the pattern of preacquistion returns is similar to what report here.  
Besides world bank definition of “high income” countries, we also use the “developed” definition in Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Levine (2001). If claims on private sector by deposit money banks as a share of GDP and the total value traded 
on the stock market as a share of GDP in a given country are both below period mean, the country is flagged as 
“developing”.     15
  In Columns 6-9 of Table 4, we report pre-acquisition valuation differences for different legal 
regimes in the acquiring and target countries.
11  In general, weak law target countries are associated 
with higher pre-acquisition differences, in terms of market to book ratios, local currency returns and 
exchange rate returns, especially when the acquirer is from a strong law country.  This pattern 
suggests that governance-driven cross-border acquisitions characterized by Rossi and Volpin (2004) 
tend to occur during times when the target company’s country is doing relatively poorly.  The 
potential governance improvements from the stronger legal protection appear to be supplemented by 
a valuation effect. 
  In the final four columns of Table 4, we break down the valuation differences by whether the 
acquirer and target are from the same region of the world, and also by whether they are related or 
diversifying mergers.
12   In general the valuation metrics are similar regardless of whether the 
acquirer and target are in the same or different regions.  However, the valuation differences tend to 
be somewhat larger for related than for diversifying mergers for most of the measures of valuation 
we use. 
4.4.  Differences in Valuation Using Country-Level Panel Data: Multivariate Evidence 
  To formally evaluate the hypothesis that relative valuation can affect merger propensities, we 
rely on a multivariate framework that controls for other potentially relevant factors.  It is not obvious, 
however, what the most natural approach is to address this question.  One possibility is to use deal 
level data on the acquirer’s and target’s market valuations.  This approach has the advantage of 
utilizing the most accurate measure of firm values in the comparison.  However, it has the 
disadvantage of only being usable for the subsample of deals having both public acquirers and public 
targets.  As discussed above, the vast majority of cross-border acquisitions have either private 
                                                 
11 If the Shareholder Protection Index (the product of “Rule of Law” and “Antidirector Rights” variables from La 
Porta et al. (1998)) is below median, we categorize the country as “Weak Law”. 
12 If target and acquirer’s countries are from the same broadly-defined continent (Africa, America, Asia, and 
Europe), we call the deal “same region” (Source: World Atlas 1995).  We define deals as “related” if the target firm 
and the acquiring firm have the same 3-digit SIC code.   16
acquirers or targets (or both), so using deal level data necessitates discarding the vast majority of the 
sample.  An alternative approach relies on country-level data.  This approach has the disadvantage of 
ignoring firm-level information (where available) but has the advantage of being able to utilize the 
entire sample of deals.  In addition, a number of hypotheses of interest, in particular those concerning 
currency movements and country-level stock market movements, are testable using country level 
data.  Since each approach has both advantages and disadvantages, we use both:  We first estimate 
equations using the entire sample of deals using country-level data on market indices, valuation 
levels, and exchange rates.  We then estimate similar equations with deal-level data on the smaller 
sample of deals involving public acquirers and targets.   
  We estimate an econometric specification in which the dependent variable is the number of 
deals for a particular country pair in a specified year, normalized by the total number of deals for that 
target country in that year.
13  Our sample consists of country pairs with one observation per year for 
each pair, for a total of 16,524 observations.  To control for the cross-sectional factors discussed 
above as well as long-term trends in currency movements that affect merger propensities (Table 3), 
we include country-pair fixed effects.
14  This specification allows us to exploit time-series variation 
in relative valuations while controlling for cross-country differences.  We estimate the equation using 
OLS and report heteroskedastic-consistent estimates of the standard errors.  
  Table 5 presents estimates of this equation. The stock return and currency differences are 
measured over the 12 months prior to the year in question.
15 “∆Currency R12” is the difference in the 
past 12-month real exchange-rate return between acquirer and target country currencies. “∆Market 
R12” is the difference in the past 12-month local real stock-market return between acquirer and target 
                                                 
13 We have also estimated all equations reported below using a dependent variable equal to the log of one plus the 
normalized number of deals from a particular country pair.  The results using this alternative dependent variable are 
similar to those reported below. 
14 Note that the pairs are ordered, so that, for example, there would be a U.S.-Canada dummy variable as well as a 
Canada-U.S. dummy variable in each equation. 
15 We have also estimated these equations using 24 and 36 month windows for measuring stock and currency returns 
prior to the acquisition with similar results.  In addition, we have estimated these equations on U.S. and non-U.S. 
subsamples, again with results similar to those reported in Table 5.   17
country market indices, while “∆Market MTB” is the difference in the value-weighted market-to-
book equity ratio between acquirer and target country. All equations also include differences in the 
log of GDP and the differences in GDP growth rates as well as year and country-pair dummies.  
Columns 1-6 include all deals, columns 7-12 restrict the sample to deals involving private acquirers 
and targets, while columns 13-18 include only public acquirers and targets.
16 
  Columns 1, 7 and 13 present the basic regression for each group of deals.  Except in the 
public-firms subsample, the coefficients on the return and currency differences, as well as the GDP 
and growth differences, are positive and statistically significantly different from zero.  These positive 
coefficients on the valuation differences imply that when valuations are higher in one country than 
another, the expected number of acquisitions by the first country’s firms of the second country’s 
firms increases.  To interpret the magnitudes of these coefficients, it is convenient to calculate the 
percentage increase in expected acquisitions for a country pair implied by a given return differential.  
Interpreted this way, the coefficients in Panel A of Table 5 imply that for 100% difference in local 
currency returns leads to a 17.4% increase in the expected number of acquisitions for a particular 
country pair.
17  Similarly, a 75% difference in exchange rate returns implies a 50.4% increase in 
acquisitions.
18   These effects appear to be fairly large, implying that the effects of valuation on 
merger probabilities are substantial.
19 
                                                 
16 We restrict the sample to those country-pairs with at least one merger at some point during the sample period.  We 
have estimated these equations using samples including all country pairs, as well as only those country pairs with at 
least 10 mergers over the entire sample.  In each case the results are similar to those reported in Table 5. 
17 The average ratio of cross-border merger to domestic mergers for a given country-pair in a given year is 0.0461. 
Using the coefficient of the country-level 12 month real stock returns in column (1) of Table 5, we can calculate the 
percentage change in the ratio for an average country pair: (0.008*100%)/0.0461=17.4%. We emphasize that 100% 
country-level 12 month stock return difference between target and acquirer is not a rare event. In our sample, 55 
country-pairs had a return difference at least this large. 
18 Similar to our calculation for country-level stock market returns, the percentage change in the number of cross-
border merger when there is a 75% difference in exchange rate returns, is (0.031*75%)/0.0461=50.4%. Note also 
that 75% difference between target and acquirer in currency movement is not a rare event. 95 country-pairs had such 
experience in the past 15 years, mostly due to currency depreciation in target countries, e.g. Turkey and Brazil 
(1994), and Argentina and Peru (1990). 
19 The linear specification is convenient, but it is possible that there are important nonlinearities it does not capture.  
We intend to investigate this possibility in future drafts of this paper.  In particular, we intend to explore the extent   18
  Columns 2, 8 and 14 of Table 5, break up the local market and currency returns by a dummy 
variable which equals 1 if the GDP per capita in the acquirer country is larger than that in the target 
country, while Columns 3, 9 and 15 perform a similar decomposition for regional differences.  The 
findings in these columns indicate that both the stock return and currency differences have the largest 
impact on merger propensities when firms from wealthier countries are considering purchasing firms 
from poorer countries.  The regional decomposition indicates that the currency effect is largest for 
country-pairs in the same region.  However, for the whole sample, the stock market effect is positive 
and statistically significantly different from zero for out-of-region deals and equals zero for mergers 
within a region.
20 
  Columns 4, 10 and 16 consider how country-level differences in market-to-book ratios affect 
merger likelihoods.  The coefficients on the market to book differences are again positive and 
statistically significantly different from zero, except in the last panel, where the coefficient is positive 
but not significant.  To interpret the magnitude of the coefficient on market to book ratios from the 
equation in Column 4, keeping all other variables constant, the model implies that a difference of one 
in market-to-book ratios leads to an expected increase of 7% increase in the volume of cross-border 
mergers. 
21   
We break down the impact of country-level market to book ratio differences on mergers by 
the relative wealth of the countries and by the regional differences in the remaining columns of Table 
5, Panel A.  These results suggest that, consistent with the results using returns and currencies, 
valuation differences are most important when firms from wealthier countries purchase firms from 
nearby poorer countries.  This pattern is consistent with some cross-border mergers occurring when 
                                                                                                                                                             
to which all market and currency movements affect merger propensities, or if the effect is only important for 
extreme movements. 
20 For deals within region, the effect is the sum of the coefficient on ∆Market R12 plus the coefficient on this 
variable interacted with the “Same Region” dummy variable.  Since the sum of these coefficients equals zero, the 
net effect of stock market returns for within region mergers is zero. 
21 A difference of one (or larger) in country-level market-to-book ratios is not uncommon.  For example market-to-
book ratios for the U.K. and Belgium in 1997 are respectively 2.7 and 1.7 for a difference of one, while market-to-
book ratios for the U.S. and South Korea in 1998 are respectively 2.6 and 0.6,which is a difference of two.   19
firms in richer countries purchasing firms from nearby poorer countries when they are relatively 
inexpensive following a currency depreciation or a decline in the poorer country’s stock market.  
4.4.1. Interpreting the Relation between Valuation and Merger Propensities.   
  There are two possible explanations for the relation between valuation and merger 
propensities. Increases in relative valuation, either through stock price increases or currency 
appreciation, could reflect real increases in wealth, leading to improved firms’ abilities to finance 
acquisitions (Froot and Stein (1991)).  Alternatively, the changes in relative valuation could reflect 
errors in valuation, in which case firms should rationally take advantage of this misvaluation to 
purchase relatively cheap assets, i.e., firms in another country that are not as overvalued (Shleifer and 
Vishny (2003)).  The overvaluation argument applies mainly to public acquirers who can either issue 
equity or make stock acquisitions to take advantage of the high valuation, but as Baker et al. (2009) 
argue, it could potentially apply to private acquirers as well if the overvalued equity market lowers 
the cost of capital in a country for private firms.  Of course, the Shleifer and Vishny argument 
applied to undervaluation following a currency crisis or large stock market decline would apply 
equally for public and private firms. 
  A prediction of the incorrect relative valuation argument is that subsequent to acquisitions by 
relatively overvalued firms, there should be a price reversal and acquirers should underperform 
relative to targets.  In particular, the overvaluation argument implies that if an acquirer purchases a 
target to arbitrage differences in the price levels across countries, these differences should narrow 
subsequent to the acquisition.  To evaluate this possibility, we include future return differences in 
Panel A of Table 6.  The results are somewhat ambiguous, but seem to indicate that, if anything, the 
difference in currency returns tends to persist following the acquisition.  This pattern is inconsistent 
with the notion that overvaluation explains the impact of valuation on merger decisions. 
  To test this hypothesis formally, we follow an approach developed by Baker et al. (2009).  
These authors argue that the market to book ratio can be broken into two components: the component   20
due to real expected wealth and the component due to over or under reaction by the market to news.  
To estimate the magnitude of each component, Baker et al. (2009) estimate equations where the 
market to book ratio is a function of future stock returns.  To the extent that the market to book ratio 
reflects overvaluation at the time of acquisitions, periods of high acquisitions should be followed by 
periods of poor returns.  The “fitted” component of market to book should represent that component 
arising from overvaluation while the “residual” component comes from real wealth effect. 
  In the first-stage equation, where country-level market-to-book ratios are predicted using 
future returns, the coefficients on future returns are negative. This finding is consistent with the 
literature and suggests that higher country-level market-to-book ratios do lead to lower future stock 
returns in that country.  However, when we break down the market to book differences between 
countries into “fitted” and “residual” components (see Panel B of Table 6), for most specifications 
only the residual is positively related to acquisitions, as predicted by the wealth-effect hypothesis.  
Only in the sample of acquisitions of private firms, for which stock market misvaluation is least 
likely to affect acquisitions, is the difference of the fitted values statistically significant.
22  In the 
sample of deals involving public targets and acquirers, the coefficient on the difference in fitted 
components is actually negative, which is the opposite of what the overvaluation hypothesis predicts.  
Consequently, this evidence suggests that the valuation effect occurs because of the wealth effect 
described by Froot and Stein (1991) rather than the mispricing effect discussed by Shleifer and 
Vishny (2003). 
4.5. Valuation Using Deal-Level Panel Data 
  We have documented that valuation appears to play an important role in determining which 
firms are likely to merge. Acquirers tend to be valued relatively highly compared to targets, using 
prior returns or market to book ratios as measures of valuation.  This difference in valuation between 
                                                 
22 The “private sample” includes all acquisitions with either a private acquirer or target, so that the “public sample” 
includes just the deals for which both acquirer and target are public.   21
acquirers and targets appears to occur due to both stock market and currency effects.  Yet, the results 
presented so far are all done at the country level.  Consequently, they do not control for firm-level 
factors that potentially affect the decision to merge, including the firm’s own valuation. 
  To control for firm-level factors, we consider the subsample of firms for which we have 
public data on both acquirers and targets.  Unfortunately, this subsample is both relatively small and 
unrepresentative of the overall sample of mergers, because firms in this subsample are much more 
likely to be from developed rather than developing countries.  Of the 56,978 cross-border mergers in 
our sample, only 911 have both public acquirers and targets, and also have data available on firm 
level variables we use to control for other factors that potentially affect mergers.  Of these 911 
mergers, 877 have acquirers from developed countries and 780 targets are from developed countries.  
While these mergers are interesting in their own right, they are not representative of cross-border 
mergers in general. 
  To estimate the factors that affect mergers, one would ideally like to consider every possible 
pair of firms that could conceivably merge and estimate the likelihood that any two of them actually 
do merge.  Unfortunately, this approach would be infeasible as the number of possible combinations 
would be extremely large relative to the number of actual mergers.  Instead, we adopt two alternative 
approaches designed to infer the factors leading one firm to buy another.   
4.5.1.  Cross-Border vs. Domestic Mergers. 
  We first consider the sample of all mergers of publicly traded firms (including domestic 
ones), and estimate the characteristics of the firms involved with the merger that are associated with 
it being a cross-border that lead a particular merger to be either cross-border or domestic.  We 
estimate logit models that predict whether an observed merger is domestic or cross-border as a 
function of deal characteristics.  Intuitively, this approach presumes that domestic mergers can 
provide a benchmark through which we can understand the nature of cross-border mergers.   22
  We present estimates of these equations in Table 7.  The first two columns include the 
difference in the acquirer and target returns, converted to U.S. dollars, as an explanatory variable.  
Both coefficients are positive and in the second column, which controls for whether the two firms are 
in the related industries and the sizes of the targets and acquirers, the coefficient is statistically 
significantly different from zero.  The positive coefficient indicates that cross-border acquisitions 
tend to have larger return differences between acquirers and targets. 
  In Columns 3 and 4 we break up the return differences into three components, the differences 
in local stock market indices, the currency return between the two countries’ currencies, and the 
differences in firm-level excess returns relative to the market.
23   The coefficients on all three 
variables are positive, but often insignificant.  The positive coefficients on currency differences and 
differences in local market returns are consistent with the valuation arguments and suggest that 
differences in these variables are determinants of cross-border mergers. 
4.5.2.  Predicting the identity of target and acquirers 
  Another way to evaluate the motives for cross-border mergers is to characterize the attributes 
of the firms involved as targets and acquirers relative to each other.  If the underlying reason for the 
merger is to take advantage of valuation differences, then one ought to be able to predict which firms 
will be acquirers or targets using measures of valuation.  Consequently, we consider the sample 
consisting of all firms involved in a public/public cross-border merger and estimate equations 
predicting whether a particular firm is a target or acquirer.  Because the dependent variable is 
dichotomous, we estimate the equations by logit and present the results in Table 8.  We estimate 
these equations for both domestic and cross-border mergers; the domestic mergers are in Columns 1-
4 while the cross-border ones are in 5-8. 
  The results in Table 8 indicate that for both domestic and cross-border mergers, acquirers 
outperform targets prior to the acquisition.   This finding is consistent with prior literature on 
                                                 
23 For the domestic deals, the differences in the local market returns and the currency returns will be identically zero.   23
domestic mergers suggesting that acquirers typically have higher valuations than targets. In Columns 
7 and 8, we break down each return for the cross-border sample into 3 components, reflecting the 
local stock market index (in local currency), the currency return (relative to U.S. dollars), and the 
local firm-specific residual.  The results indicate that only the firm specific component of returns is 
related to whether a firm is an acquirer or a target, not the local stock-market return or the currency 
return.  These results are somewhat different from what we found at the country level but similar to 
the deal-level regressions in Table 7 using the domestic/cross-border specification.  This difference 
between country-level results and deal-level results is somewhat puzzling and could potentially 
reflect the fact the sample of public cross-border deals is relatively small and concentrated in 
developed countries, for which pre-acquisition currency differences are very small (see Table 4). 
 
5.  Conclusion  
About one-third of worldwide mergers combine firms from two different countries.  As the 
world’s economy becomes increasingly integrated, cross-border mergers are likely to become even 
more important in the future.  Yet, in the voluminous academic literature on mergers, the vast 
majority of research has studied domestic deals.  Moreover, what little work that has been done on 
cross-border mergers has focused on public and/or U.S. based firms.  Understanding the patterns and 
motivations for cross-border mergers is consequently an important and understudied research topic. 
In contrast to the presumptions of the academic literature, most cross-border mergers do not 
involve U.S. firms and do involve privately-held firms.  In our sample of 56,978 cross-border 
mergers that occurred between 1990 and 2007, 97% involved a private firm as either acquirer or 
target, while 53% did not involve a U.S. firm.  Geography matters; the odds of acquiring a firm in a 
nearby country are substantially higher than the odds of acquiring a firm in a country far away.  In 
addition, higher economic development, better legal protection and better accounting quality are all 
associated with the likelihood of being an acquirer rather than a target.   24
A major factor determining the pattern of cross-border mergers is currency movements. Over 
the entire sample period, countries whose currencies have appreciated are more likely to have 
acquiring firms while countries whose currencies have depreciated are more likely to have targeted 
firms.  Controlling for these overall time trends econometrically, short-term movements between two 
countries’ currencies increase the likelihood that firms in the country with the appreciating currency 
purchase firms in the country with the depreciating currency. 
In addition, the relative stock market performance between two countries affects the 
propensity of firms in these countries to merge.  Our estimates indicate that the greater the difference 
in stock market performance between the countries, the more likely that firms in the superior-
performing country purchase firms in the worse-performing country. 
The impacts of currency movements and of stock market performance on merger propensities 
are likely symptomatic of a more general valuation effect, in which more highly valued firms tend to 
purchase lower-valued firms.  This effect has been documented for domestic acquisitions of U.S. 
firms in a number of studies, and has been generally attributed to misvaluation arguments ( Shleifer 
and Vishny (2003),  Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004)).  Yet in an international context, there 
is an additional reason why higher-valued firms would purchase lower-valued firms; firms from 
wealthier countries will have a tendency to purchase firms from poorer countries because of a cost of 
capital effect described by  Froot and Stein (1991).  We evaluate both the mispricing and wealth 
explanations econometrically and find support for the wealth explanation rather than the mispricing 
explanation. 
  With the increasing integration of the world economy, it is likely that more mergers will 
involve firms from different countries.  We have provided a preliminary analysis of the patterns and 
reasons for cross-border mergers.  Some of these mergers undoubtedly occur for the same synergistic 
reasons as domestic mergers.  Yet others appear to reflect country-level factors such as currency 
appreciation and macroeconomic performance.  The extent to which each type of factor affects the   25
likelihood of firms to purchase one another is an important topic for future research.  26
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Figure 1. Number (Value) of cross-border mergers and acquisitions. This figure plots the number 
(value) of cross-border deals between 1990 and 2007. Deals in which acquirer’s ultimate 
ownership is less than 50% or the total deal value less than $1 million are excluded.  
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Figure 3. Geometric Return Differences between Target and Acquirer. The graph on the left is 
the mean and on the right in the median. 
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World sample mean excluding deals involving U.S. firms. 
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Table 1. Number of Mergers and Acquisitions across country-pair. Initial sample of block acquisitions from Thomson Financial’s Security Data Corporation 
(SDC) Platinum Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) database. We exclude deals that are LBOs, spin-offs, recapitalizations, self-tender, exchange offers, repurchases, acquisitions of 
remaining interest, minority stake purchases and privatizations as well as deals in which the target or the acquirer is a government agency, or in the financial or utilities industry.  
  Origin Country   
Destination  AR  AS AU BL  BR CA CC  CE  CH  CO  CTCY DN  FN  FR GR HK HU ID IN IR  IS IT  JP  LX MA MX NO NT NZ  PE PH PL PO RU SA SG SK SP  SW  SZ TH TKTW UK  US VE WG Total
Argentina(AR)  201  1 4 4  30  42   13    1    5    57  1  1    2 6   17 4     16 1  28  3    1    2   54 5 14  1     58  243  4  22 640 
Austria(AS)    341  4 8  19  1      19 7 35  3  1  2    2 7 1  25 7 8    1  7  25    2  1  2  1   5 19 33   1    52  84   255  637 
Australia(AU)   3  4,875  7 2  145    1    20  7  62   43  5 16 24 6  8  69 2 51 1  10 64  145   5  1 1  58 75 5  5  40 47 2  1  2 430  812  63  2,238
Belgium(BL)   7 13  494    12           21 12 169  4 1   9 16 2 17 24 5     9  206  1   1 3 1 6 1   9  30 18   1   148  197  79  1,022
Brazil(BR)  40  3  14  9  565  48   15    4    14 6 94  3    6 8 8  41 18  6   19 9  28  3      35  4  5  52 16 22   1  1 58  388  60  1,038
Canada(CA)  1 10 59 14 7  6,220  1    8        12  11 112 2 16  3 11 13  9  19  58 11 4  4 13 54  5 1 3      1 9 1 3  6  34  56      4  328 2,516 1 80 3,500
Czech  Republic(CC)    31  1 9  1  10  143      1  14 6 38  1  1  8    5 6 1 7  3 3     9  25    8  6  1    8 16 23     47  77  76 442 
Chile(CE)  6    14  1  4  39    101         1 1 8    1    1  1  4 1    7  6  10  5  3    1  2       21 3 1     1 13  82  1  8 246 
China(CH)  1 2 36  14  1 43      513      9  10 31 2  214  3 9  1  2 13 53 1 27 1 6 19 3  3      2  120 34 6  11 10 4   19 58  301  22  1,091
Colombia(CO)  1   2   3  17   3    37        1  8       1       4 2  10  1 1  2       2    13 3  4     6  35 1 1 121 
Croatia(CT)    12               26  3    7  1    5    1  1  4 1       2            1 1 2       8  4  6 59 
Cyprus(CY)          1            37    1  7                              1          1       2  1   14 
Denmark(DN)   5 4 10    9     1  1 1  889 39 39 1  2    3 11 3 11  8 2 1   94 38    1  1  1  4   4 198 28     117 173  80 890 
Finland(FN)   9 7 7  16       69  1,614 34  2  1    2  22  2  11 23  4      53 24      7  1  5  11  281  31  1  2  1 60  147  41 874 
France(FR)  1  20 28  236  7 116     4       68  38  4,837 8  13 2   12 27 13 164 97 28 1  1 22 209         8 2 6 5 2 87 116 154 2  1  708  970   434  3,610
Greece(GR)    1 3   4       6     6  339           7  1 2    1 6      1  2        3  5     15  18  9  90 
Hong  Kong(HK)    28  1  22    42     10 4 20  3  348   2 1    4 2 30  73    6     2    4  80 8 2  4  7 3  1  4 67  170  14 614 
Hungary(HU)    28   4   3 2     2   2  5  28 3   136   2 2 4 11  5 2     4 42    5  2  2   2  11 14  1  1  26  69   52 334 
Indonesia(ID)    10  1  15          1  2 1  9   98 4      1 16  19  2 4     1    2  24 8    2  7 4  1    26  32  7 199 
India(IN)   5  24  3  15   1     5  2 39  8   1 764 1 2  12 16  17  5  19    1  1  3  6  11 7 6 19 28  3    101 233  43 637 
Ireland-Rep(IR)   1 5 4   8        6  1 18  2  2    4  354  1 3  5 1 1 1  6  10    1  1  3  3  2   2  5  5 1  1   265 172  15 555 
Israel(IS)    2  2    10           3    8   1      1  1  160 2 1       3          3  1  1   3 3   1  1 26 171    12  256 
Italy(IT)    24  17  23  6  24   3     24 19  236  13 10 1  1 10 9 9  1,633 29  16 2   7  98  1     2  5  5  2  38 60 65   1   233 428   164  1,585
Japan(JP)     1 5   6    4     4  2 31  3  12   2 1 1 3 1  5,698   1    16    1   1  2  1  12 2 11 8 1    9 46  259  42 488 
Luxembourg(LX)    1  16                  8 2            3   8     5 1          1 1  4  2     12  13  14 83 
Malaysia(MA)    17    6        6  2  7    17   2 2    1 1 19   1,711 1  2 7 4    4   1  2  123 1 2  2  8     4 28  43  9 321 
Mexico(MX)  2   4  3 6  116  4 1  2    8  2  24 3 4     4    6  7  1   188 1 18 3  1  1        2 1 35 10  8     1  33  320 1 18 650 
Norway(NO)   3 4 5  2 8        1  102  55 27  1     1 2 2 5  3 4 2 1  688  30    1  1  1  2  1   2 193  21    103 130  26 739 
Netherlands(NT)   16 26 95  5 44    2 1    1 36  27 122 3 9 1  9 60 9 29  39 9  4  2 18 1,512  2     2 2 1 9 3    16  66  47 1 2 3  441  436   228  1,826
New  Zealand(NZ)   2  302  1  41   2     4  3  8   5   1 2 7      19  13  2  14  570    1    6  13 2    5  7 3     71  140  6 680 
Peru(PE)  1   2  1  3  54    6    1          1  1                 2 3   2   39        5    3       7  30  1 123 
Philippines(PH)     10    9              6   5             11    10  2   1     115      12 1  1 2 2      13  32  2 119 
Poland(PL)   9  1 11   12 4      2  26 16 45 3  5  6 12 3 19  2 13    16 39      227 4 2 2 1 2 13 23 10        57  76   63 497 
Portugal(PO)   1 3 5  5 5   1     8  1 44  1  1  2    2 2   11 2 1    1  4  13      246     72 12 12     51  40  20 320 
Russian  Fed(RU)   4 2 7  24  2      8 9 23 10  5  3    2 2   11 3 9      14 18  1    6   526     4 25 15   3    59  83  30 382 
South  Africa(SA)    36  2  35       4  4 23  2  3    7 3 1 7 11  4 5   2  11  2    1  2  1  790 3  1    15 15    1 170 113  36 520 
Singapore(SG)    28  1   7    1     1 7  4 16   35   10 22   2 5 25  98   10 8 1    1    3  614 2 1  9  7 9    6 42  116  15 492 
South  Korea(SK)   2 3 4  10   1     4  1 27  4    2    4    30   2 1  2  10      1  1  6  631 2  3  8     2 27  107  30 294 
Spain(SP)  2 6  8 32  4 27   5  2  1  44  8 296  8 3   7 10 4  121 29 2    6  15 133    1  60 1 1 1   1,896 60 35        271  287  169  1,659
Sweden(SW)   9 10  14   24         176  198 67 3  5    4 10 4 11 23 9 1    182  65    1  1  2  3   2  1,558 31   2 218 288 1 99  1,463
Switzerland(SZ)   43 9 31   20     1  1  38 15 122  5 1  7 10  15 36 16 6  3   8 49     1 2 5 4 6   4  45 794    2 103  261  311  1,180
Thailand(TH)    5  2   2    1       2 1 9   10   1 7    1 36  1  23   1  6  2    1  1     2  37 1   3 2  194   4 22  40  9 232 
Turkey(TK)    1  1  6   4         1  2 3 16  5  1  2     2  2  10 2  1   9        1  4  1    3 4 2   72  27  33   27  170 
Taiwan(TW)    4   5          2 1 5   11        1  13   2   2           21 5   4 1  2    130 10  82   10  181 
United  Kingdom(UK)    29 177 91 2  305  3    1    2 4 158  66  485 17 60 2 2 82 410 20 92  173 21 21  2 89 313 14   1  2  8 10 86 42 9  43  206 126  7  2  5 15,196 3,122  443  6,753
United  States(US)  10  36 392  121  35  2,752  1 8 34 6 1   128 130 719 28 95 1  10 179 316  169 146 827 28 24 73 86 453 28  13 1 5 21 75 104 54 91  351 358 9 5 68 3,073 66,948 5 817  11,886
Venezuela(VE)  1     1  4  22    1         2   11             5   1  2   2            7    5       8  49  16 1 122 
Germany(WG)   234 42 105  6  80  5 2 5    1   124 134 454 13 20 3 2 29 38 16 128 111 40 8  5 42 443 1   10 6 3 5 18 11 11 37  194 375 1 5 3  724 1,611 1 5,771 5,106
Total  66 557 1,360 919 133 4,236  19  60  112 16  12 23 1,199 866  3,634 150 633 40 45 473 1,044 324 1,027 1,874 242 416  160 758 2,588 226  7  51 41 142 90 333 729 171 675 2,127 1,686 54 29 145 8,468 15,034 15 3,969 56,978
   35
 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics of cross-border M&As by target country. The industry classification is by 
target firm. Agriculture (001~999), Mining and Construction (1000~1999), Manufacturing (2000~3999), Transportation 
excluding Utilities (4000~4999), Trade (5000~5999),  and Services (7000~8999).  











Construction Manufacturing Transportation Trade  Services 
Argentina 201  640  9  93  275 63  72  127 
Austria 341  637  2  17  305  61  93  159 
Australia 4,875  2,238  22  247  740  195  261  768 
Belgium 494  1,022  4  28  388  103  152  346 
Brazil 565  1,038  28  71  556  90  102  190 
Canada 6,220  3,500  27  397  1,313  224  385  1,151 
Czech Republic  143  442  4  24  211  39  58  104 
Chile 101  246  8  60  79  37  23  39 
China 513  1,091  9  62  656  80  64  212 
Colombia 37  121    32  48  15  10  16 
Croatia 26  59  2  4  32  4  6  11 
Cyprus 37  14  1  1  5    4  3 
Denmark 889  890    33  390  87  143  237 
Finland 1,614  874  6  52  334  92  124  264 
France 4,837  3,610  28  74  1,841  213  471  979 
Greece 339  90    7  41  14  11  17 
Hong Kong  348  614    32  201  83  97  201 
Hungary 136  334  3  19  169  42  31  70 
Indonesia 98  199  11  55  94  12  7  18 
India 764  637  5  27  326  41  29  204 
Ireland-Rep 354  555 2 22 201  60  82  185 
Israel 160  256  2  3  117  14  15  105 
Italy 1,633  1,585  4  26  998  106  187  262 
Japan 5,698  488  1  4  240  42  75  126 
Luxembourg 8  83    3 22 14  10  34 
Malaysia 1,711  321  7  15  153  24  62  59 
Mexico 188  650  7  126  312  43  66  96 
Norway 688  739  6  61  215  104  117  236 
Netherlands 1,512  1,826 19  60  769  216  276  486 
New Zealand  570  680  10  29  223  70  112  233 
Peru 39  123    69  31  10  8  5 
Philippines 115  119  2  23  54  8  7  25 
Poland 227  497  9  25  287  34  69  68 
Portugal 246  320  1  11  144  36  43  84 
Russian Fed  526  382  1  95  161  53  21  49 
South Africa  790  520  6  114  213  27  52  107 
Singapore 614  492  1  27  180 69  61  153 
South Korea  631  294  1  1  190  20  28  52 
Spain 1,896  1,659  13  53  725  133  254  479 
Sweden 1,558  1,463  5  45  632  131  190  460 
Switzerland 794  1,180 6 21 597  73  133  348 
Thailand 194  232  2  18  127  19  29  37 
Turkey 72  170  2  20  88  10  18  32 
Taiwan 130  181    1  97  13  26  43 
United Kingdom  15,196  6,753  42  306  2,825  490  844  2,231 
United States  66,948  11,886  74  874  5,365  655  1,209  3,693 
Venezuela 16  122  1  32  59  13  5  12 
Germany 5,771  5,106  12  141  2,753  329  663  1,196   36
Table 3 Cross-sectional analysis of the intensity of cross-border M&As. Dependent variable is the ratio of the number of deals in which the target is from 
country i and the acquirer is from country j (where i ≠ j) to the total number of domestic deals in target country i. ∆ (Currency R12)j-i is the difference in the average annual real 
exchange rate return in US$ from 1990 to 2007 between acquirer and target country. ∆ (Market R12)j-i is the difference in the average annual local real stock market return from 
1990 to 2007 between acquirer and target country. ∆ (Account)j-i is the difference in the index created by the Center for International Financial Analysis and Research to rate the 
quality of 1990 annual reports on their disclosure of accounting information. ∆ (Legal)j=i is the difference in the shareholder protection index computed as the product of rule of 
law and antidirector rights (LLSV(1998)). Same Language is equal to 1 if target and acquirer’s primary language (English, Spanish or others) are the same. Same Religion is equal 
to 1 if target and acquirer’s primary religion (Protestant, Catholic, Muslim, Buddhist or Others) are the same (Stulz and Williamson (2003)). Geographic proximity is minus the 
great circle distance calculated using the longitudes and latitudes of the capital cities of target and acquirer countries. Average annual real growth rate of the gross domestic product 
is from 1990 to 2007 and Gross national product divided by the population is in 1990 (in US$), both from the WDI report. We calculate Huber–White standard errors. 
 
   All Target - All Acquirer     Private Target - Private Acquirer     Public Target - Public Acquirer 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4)    (5) (6) (7)  (8)    (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
∆  (Currency  R12)j-i  0.157***   0.168***  0.086***   0.102***  0.304***   0.268*** 
  (5.36)     (5.03)    (3.72)     (3.79)    (3.30)     (2.62) 
∆  (Market  R12)j-i  -0.056     0.026    -0.054     0.013    -0.017     0.010 
  (-0.85)     (0.39)    (-1.14)     (0.25)    (-0.15)     (0.09) 
∆  (Account)j-i   0.013***  0.009***   0.004*   0.001     0.031***  0.024*** 
   (4.97)   (3.37)     (1.79)   (0.63)     (4.17)   (3.21) 
∆  (Legal)j-i   0.003*   0.000     0.003**   0.001     -0.001   -0.004 
   (1.81)   (0.07)     (2.26)   (0.81)     (-0.18)   (-1.06) 
Same  Language    0.026**  0.020*      0.018**  0.015*      0.051**  0.042 
    (2.34)  (1.81)      (2.35)  (1.92)      (2.02)  (1.40) 
Same  Religion    -0.007  0.003      -0.005  -0.001      -0.002  0.009 
    (-1.51)  (0.70)      (-1.64)  (-0.26)      (-0.23)  (1.08) 
Geographic  Proximity    0.007***  0.006***    0.004***  0.004***    0.008***  0.008*** 
    (8.55)  (8.08)      (7.42)  (6.94)      (5.22)  (4.86) 
∆ ( log GDP per capita)j-i  -0.006**  0.000  0.005*  -0.003    -0.003  0.002  0.004*  -0.000    -0.006  0.002  0.013**  -0.006 
  (-2.17) (0.21)  (1.83)  (-1.35)    (-1.40) (0.97)  (1.81)  (-0.14)    (-0.99) (0.50)  (2.48)  (-1.01) 
∆  (GDP  growth)j-i  -0.003*  -0.001 -0.002 -0.001    -0.003**  -0.001 -0.002 -0.002    -0.001 -0.001 0.001  -0.002 
  (-1.81) (-0.48) (-1.35) (-1.00)    (-1.96) (-1.26) (-1.61) (-1.61)    (-0.30) (-0.27) (0.27)  (-0.81) 
Constant  0.040*** 0.036*** 0.071*** 0.060***  0.025*** 0.023*** 0.044*** 0.040***  0.042*** 0.039*** 0.077*** 0.067*** 
  (18.01) (21.77) (12.50) (13.45)    (15.89) (17.89) (10.55) (10.98)    (11.08) (12.85) (7.34)  (7.36) 
Country Dummies  yes  yes   yes   yes     yes   yes   yes   yes     yes   yes   yes   yes  
Observations  1036 893 1036  893    1036 893 1036  893    1008 881 1008 881 
R-squared  0.39 0.49 0.42  0.56    0.30 0.36 0.33  0.41    0.21 0.27 0.21 0.31 
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Table 4 Summary statistics on valuation differences between target and acquirer. R12, R24, R36 represent past 12 months, 24 months, 36 months real 
returns, respectively.  MTB is the market-equity-to-book-equity ratio of equity. For market MTB, we follow Fama and French (1998) and sum the market value of all firms within 
a country and divide it by the sum of their book value. Both market-level and firm-level stock returns are in local currency. Definition of developed countries is based on World 
Bank high-income economies. Definition of strong law countries is based on the index of shareholder protection provided by LLSV. Same region is equal to 1 if target and 
acquirer’s countries are from the same broadly defined continent (Africa, America, Asia, and Europe). Related industry is equal to 1 if target and acquirer’s 3-digit SIC overlaps.  
 
      Developing Target  Developed Target  Weak Law Target  Strong Law Target         
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13) 

























Nobs    51488  311  3853  1056  46268  4300  10591  7565  29032 26000 25488  17734  33754 
                         
Market MTBj – Market MTBi   9.93%***  20.58%***  64.74%***  (2.90%)  5.59%***  16.37%***  26.42%***  0.13%  5.52%*** 11.86%*** 7.97%***  8.50%***  10.68%*** 
   [7.25%]***  [31.19%]***  [64.45%]***  [(5.31%)]** [5.98%]*** [10.43%]*** [13.75%]***  [1.37%]*** [7.14%]*** [8.39%]*** [6.81%]*** [6.66%]*** [7.46%]***
                         
Market R12j –Market R12i    0.30%***  1.44%  0.05%  6.03%***  0.20%**  0.65%**  (0.18%) 0.81%***  0.29%*** 0.21%* 0.40%***  0.13%  0.39%*** 
   [0.33%]***  [(0.40%)]  [(3.86%)]** [8.68%]*** [0.44%]*** [0.77%]*** [(0.23%)] [0.60%]** [0.45%]*** [0.29%]*** [0.35%]*** [0.16%]  [0.45%]***
                         
Market R24j –Market R24i   0.92%***  1.57%  2.13%***  11.09%***  0.64%***  2.35%***  1.75%***  0.50%  0.49%***  0.88%***  0.96%***  0.58%***  1.10%*** 
   [1.10%]***  [4.88%]  [(1.90%)]  [15.24%]*** [1.08%]*** [2.49%]***  [1.30%]***  [0.56%]*  [0.93%]*** [0.95%]*** [1.31%]*** [0.83%]***  [1.28%]***
                         
Market R36j –Market R36i   2.12%***  1.44%  12.79%***  9.54%***  1.22%***  5.01%***  5.74%***  0.20%  0.81%***  2.43%***  1.79%***  1.36%***  2.55%*** 
   [2.45%]***  [3.61%]  [17.06%]***  [18.42%]*** [2.03%]*** [4.67%]***  [4.08%]***  [0.33%]*  [1.63%]*** [2.40%]*** [2.46%]*** [2.14%]***  [2.59%]***
                         
Currency R12j –Currency R12i   1.12%***  4.57%***  10.32%***  (5.96%)*** 0.46%***  2.55%***  2.80%***  0.25%  0.58%*** 0.88%*** 1.42%***  0.88%***  1.25%*** 
   [0.26%]***  [1.24%]  [6.18%]*** [(3.68%)]** [0.11%]*** [0.06%]  [1.27%]***  [0.02%] [0.15%]*** [0.32%]*** [0.22%]*** [0.14%]** [0.33%]***
                         
Currency R24j – Currency R24i  2.13%***  5.72%**  21.76%***  (13.40%)*** 0.79%***  5.89%***  6.04%***  (0.23%)  0.88%***  1.65%***  2.71%***  1.68%***  2.38%*** 
   [0.47%]***  [6.23%]**  [18.28%]***  [(8.69%)]** [0.08%]  [0.22%]***  [2.26%]***  [(0.52%)]** [0.24%]*** [0.59%]*** [0.36%]*** [0.25%]*** [0.57%]***
                         
Currency R36j – Currency R36i  3.43%***  10.11%***  34.22%***  (23.32%)*** 1.38%***  9.45%***  10.39%*** (1.72%)*** 1.45%***  2.77%***  4.23%***  2.89%***  3.73%*** 
   [0.91%]***  [16.79%]***  [31.37%]***  [(18.75%)]* [0.14%]  [0.72%]***  [4.76%]***  [(1.95%)]** [0.77%]*** [1.34%]*** [0.71%]*** [0.60%]*** [1.14%]***
                         
Firm MTBj – Firm MTBi   28.95%***  76.90%  47.03%**  17.27%  27.50%***  (11.37%)  77.40%***  (28.68%)*  32.49%*** 44.27%***  7.67%  10.20%  38.94%*** 
   [26.23%]***  [125.7%]**  [32.60%]**  [(20.42%)]  [25.91%]*** [9.39%]  [50.00%]***  [(6.41%)]  [30.16%]*** [30.52%]*** [18.87%]*** [18.84%]*** [30.27%]***
                         
Firm R12j –Firm R12i    10.38%***  25.82%*  6.59%**  22.36%**  10.50%***  8.07%**  8.63%*** 11.40%***  11.04%***  10.13%***  10.75%*** 9.07%*** 11.14%*** 
   [6.01%]***  [27.80%]**  [0.25%]  [16.88%]*** [5.98%]*** [7.73%]**  [4.15%]**  [6.91%]*** [6.00%]*** [5.57%]*** [6.70%]*** [3.09%]*  [7.22%]***
                         
Firm R24j –Firm R24i   19.34%***  35.75%  11.96%**  41.81%**  19.61%***  11.45%**  17.04%***  18.44%*** 21.50%*** 20.89%*** 17.11%***  16.50%***  21.01%*** 
   [12.15%]***  [49.51%]  [1.70%]  [46.96%]  [12.62%]*** [12.06%]*  [10.12%]*** [12.56%]*** [13.12%]*** [11.86%]*** [12.71%]*** [8.69%]*** [15.01%]***
                         
Firm R36j –Firm R36i   23.36%***  115.8%*  20.37%***  63.13%*** 23.02%***  19.30%***  21.83%***  17.79%*** 26.44%*** 23.46%*** 23.20%***  18.69%***  26.18%*** 
   [17.02%]***  [116.2%]  [8.98%]*  [52.34%]*** [16.96%]*** [7.78%]*  [15.04%]***  [11.16%]*** [22.33%]*** [18.28%]*** [15.38%]*** [14.33%]*** [20.76%]***
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Table 5 Analysis of the intensity of cross-border M&As using panel data on country pairs. Dependent variable is the ratio of the number of deals in 
which the target is from country i and the acquirer is from country j (where i ≠ j) to the total number of domestic deals in country i. ∆ Currency R12 is the difference in the past12-
month real exchange rate return between acquirer and target country. ∆ Market R12 is the difference in the past 12-month local real stock market return between acquirer and target 
country. ∆Market MTB is the difference in the value-weighted market equity to book equity ratio between acquirer and target country. Higher GDP per capital is equal to 1 if 
acquirer country’s GDP per capita is larger than or equal to that of target country. Standard errors are robust. 
 
   All Targets-All Acquirers    Private Targets-Private Acquirers  Public Targets-Public Acquirers 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) (12)  (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
0.008***  0.001  0.012***     0.007** 0.000  0.005      0.005  -0.003  -0.001      ∆Market R12 
(2.59) (0.41) (3.38)        (2.23) (0.09) (1.57)        (0.92) (-0.58) (-0.24)       
0.031***  0.001  0.006      0.025*** 0.003  0.012      0.026** -0.001  0.012      ∆Currency R12 
(3.54) (0.35) (0.76)        (2.84) (0.81) (1.36)        (2.07) (-0.16) (0.97)       
    0.004*** 0.000  0.003***     0.004***  0.000  0.003**     0.003  0.001  0.000  ∆Market MTB 
    (5.08)  (0.83)  (3.04)      (4.12)  (0.17)  (2.23)      (1.52)  (0.52)  (0.17) 
  0.012**         0.012**        0.017*       ∆Market R12 × I_ GDP capita 
  (2.26)         (2.30)         (1.68)      
  0.051***         0.041***        0.063**      ∆Currency R12 × I_GDP capita 
  (3.35)         (2.58)         (2.22)      
   -0.012*         0.003         0.016      ∆Market R12 × Same Region 
   (-1.89)         (0.52)         (1.49)     
   0.084***        0.047**        0.054      ∆Currency R12× Same Region 
   ( 3 . 5 7 )          ( 1 . 9 7 )          ( 1 . 5 1 )      
     0.007***        0.007***        0.005    ∆Market MTB × I_ GDP capita 
     ( 4 . 6 2 )          ( 4 . 0 0 )          ( 1 . 1 3 )    
      0.003*        0.004*        0.009*  ∆Market MTB × Same Region 
      ( 1 . 8 5 )         ( 1 . 6 9 )         ( 1 . 9 1 )  
0.042***  0.041***  0.041*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.012 0.012  0.012* 0.031*  0.032*  0.031*  0.034 0.034  0.035*  ∆ ( log GDP per capita)j-i 
(5.05) (4.98) (4.93) (3.40) (3.42) (3.41)  (3.00) (2.95) (2.94) (1.64) (1.60) (1.66)  (1.69) (1.72) (1.67) (1.64) (1.61) (1.67) 
-0.017  -0.017  -0.022 0.039 0.037  0.043* -0.008  -0.009  -0.006 0.019 0.017 0.024  0.014 0.010 0.023 0.003 0.002 0.010  ∆ (GDP growth)j-i 
(-0.65) (-0.66) (-0.84) (1.60)  (1.53) (1.75)  (-0.33)  (-0.36)  (-0.26) (0.83) (0.73) (1.00)  (0.32) (0.23) (0.52) (0.08) (0.06) (0.23) 
0.084*** 0.083*** 0.084*** 0.050*** 0.040*** 0.050*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.054*** Constant 
(12.15) (12.09) (12.16) (13.76) (12.45) (13.77)  (8.22) (8.16) (8.21) (8.28) (7.64) (8.30)  (2.67) (2.62) (2.65) (5.51) (5.56) (5.53) 
Year  dummies  yes yes yes yes yes yes    yes yes yes yes yes yes    yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Country  pair  dummies  yes yes yes yes yes yes  yes yes yes yes yes yes  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations  16524 16524 16524 16318 16318 16318  15930 15930 15930 15717 15717 15717  8942  8942  8942  8775  8775  8775 
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Table 6 Mispricing vs fundamental: Interpreting the relation between valuation and cross-border mergers. Dependent variable is the ratio of the 
number of deals in which the target is from country i and the acquirer is from country j (where i ≠ j) to the total number of domestic deals in country i. ∆ Currency FR12 is the 
difference in the next12-month real exchange rate return between acquirer and target country. ∆ Market FR12 is the difference in the future 12-month local real stock market return 
between acquirer and target country. ∆ (Fitted MTB) is the difference in the predicted value-weighted market-equity-to-book-equity ratio between acquirer and target country, 
using future 12-, 24-, 36-month local real stock market return and real exchange rate return. ∆ (Residual MTB) is the difference in the residuals of value-weighted market equity to 
book equity ratio between acquirer and target country, using future 12-, 24-, 36-month local real stock market return and real exchange rate return. Fitted MTB=2.017-0.033FR12-
0.137FR24-0.299FR36-0.255EXFR12-0.247EXFR24+0.487EXFR36 (N=642, R
2=0.094).  Higher GDP per capita is equal to 1 if acquirer country’s GDP per capita is larger than 
or equal to that of target country. Panel A reports regressions using future12-month stock market and exchange rate returns. Panel B reports regressions using decomposed market 
to book ratio. Standard errors are robust. 
 
Panel A - Direct tests using future returns. 
 
   All Targets-All Acquirers     Private Targets-Private Acquirers     Public Targets-Public Acquirers 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
∆Market  FR12  -0.004 -0.001 -0.004    -0.001 -0.000 0.002    0.000  0.007 -0.000 
  (-1.32) (-0.30) (-1.18)    (-0.30) (-0.02) (0.52)    (0.02)  (1.18) (-0.03) 
∆Currency  FR12  0.019*** 0.011***  0.015**  0.015**  0.006  0.015**   0.008  0.003  -0.004 
  (3.34)  (2.78)  (2.34)  (2.42)  (1.53)  (2.56)  (0.58)  (0.30)  (-0.26) 
∆Market FR12 × I_ GDP capita    -0.006        -0.002        -0.014   
    (-0.99)      (-0.29)      (-1.24)   
∆Currency FR12 ×  I_GDP  capita    0.014      0.016      0.011   
    (1.30)      (1.40)      (0.34)   
∆Market FR12 × Same Region      0.000        -0.007        -0.000 
     (0.00)       (-1.12)       (-0.02) 
∆Currency  FR12×  Same  Region     0.014       -0.002       0.047 
     (1.04)       (-0.10)       (1.28) 
∆ ( log GDP per capita)j-i  0.044***  0.044***  0.044***    0.029***  0.029***  0.030***    0.021  0.021  0.020 
  (4.88)  (4.86)  (4.87)  (3.73)  (3.72)  (3.75)  (1.04)  (1.04)  (1.01) 
∆  (GDP  growth)j-i  0.023  0.023  0.022  0.031  0.031  0.033  0.046  0.045  0.044 
  (0.89)  (0.90)  (0.85)  (1.28)  (1.28)  (1.33)  (1.14)  (1.10)  (1.07) 
Constant  0.079***  0.078***  0.079***  0.044***  0.043***  0.044***  0.020***  0.020***  0.021*** 
  (13.01)  (12.79)  (13.00)   (8.44)  (8.27)  (8.42)  (3.06)  (2.97)  (3.10) 
Year dummies  yes  yes  yes     yes  yes  yes     yes  yes  yes 
Country  pair  dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Observations  16112 16112 16112    15455 15455 15455    8766  8766  8766 
R-squared  0.49 0.49 0.49      0.35 0.35 0.35      0.34 0.34 0.34 
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Panel B - Decomposing Market-to-book 
 
   All Targets-All Acquirers    Private Targets-Private Acquirers    Public Targets-Public Acquirers 
  (1) (2)  (3)    (4)  (5)  (6)    (7)  (8) (9) 
∆ (Fitted MTB)j-i   0.001 -0.003  0.003    0.006**  -0.003  0.004    -0.003  -0.003 -0.007 
  (0.51) (-1.46)  (0.94)    (2.23)  (-1.45)  (1.47)    (-0.45)  (-0.43) (-1.05) 
∆ (Residual MTB)j-i  0.005*** 0.000  0.004***    0.004***  -0.000  0.003**    0.006**  0.003  0.003 
  (5.24) (0.71)  (3.34)    (3.78)  (-0.72)  (2.33)    (2.38)  (1.25) (0.90) 
∆ (Fitted MTB)j-i × I_ GDP capita   0.009       0.015***       -0.001  
   (1.62)        (3.19)        (-0.10)  
∆ (Residual MTB)j-i × I_GDP   0.008***        0.009***        0.007   
   (5.09)        (4.38)        (1.39)  
∆ (Fitted MTB)j-i × Same Region     -0.005       0.005        0.014 
     (-0.74)       (0.74)        (0.97) 
∆ (Residual MTB)j-i  × Same     0.004*       0.003        0.011* 
     (1.70)       (1.19)        (1.95) 
∆ ( log GDP per capita)j-i  0.016* 0.016*  0.016*    0.006  0.006  0.007    0.017  0.016  0.018 
  (1.88) (1.88)  (1.85)    (0.76)  (0.70)  (0.79)    (0.75)  (0.69) (0.80) 
∆ (GDP growth)j-i  0.058** 0.057**  0.062**    0.045*  0.042*  0.049*    -0.001  -0.003  0.007 
  (2.27) (2.23)  (2.44)    (1.86)  (1.75)  (1.94)    (-0.03)  (-0.06) (0.17) 
Constant  0.038*** 0.049***  0.038***    0.022***  0.021***  0.022***    0.053***  0.053*** 0.053*** 
  (10.57) (14.07)  (10.58)    (6.88)  (6.71)  (6.89)    (5.44)  (5.48)  (5.48) 
Year dummies  yes yes  yes    yes  yes  yes    yes  yes yes 
Country pair dummies  yes yes  yes    yes  yes  yes    yes  yes yes 
Observations  14099 14099  14099    13548  13548  13548    7811  7811  7811 
R-squared  0.52 0.52  0.52    0.35  0.35  0.35    0.38  0.38 0.38   41
Table 7 Deal-level analysis of the intensity of cross-border M&As. Dependent variable is equal to 1 if the 
M&A deal is cross-border. The sample include deals in which both target and acquirer are public. Columns (1) and (2) use the 
difference in previous year’s firm-level stock returns in $US between the acquirer and the target. Columns (3) and (4) decompose 
the difference in firm-level stock returns in $US into 3 parts: market returns in local currency (∆Market R12), currency returns 
(∆Currency R12), and firm residual stock returns in local currency (∆Firm USR12-∆Market R12-∆Currency R12). Marginal 
effects are reported. Standard errors are robust. 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
∆Firm USR12  0.012  0.030*     
 (0.85)  (1.83)     
∆Market R12      0.321**  0.188 
     (2.11)  (1.21) 
∆Currency R12      0.395  0.449 
     (1.28)  (1.39) 
∆Firm USR12-∆Market R12-∆Currency R12    0.010  0.028* 
     (0.75)  (1.82) 
Log Firm Size (Target)    -0.011    -0.009 
   (-1.62)  (-1.42) 
Log Firm Size (Acquirer)     0.056***    0.055*** 
   (8.23)  (8.13) 
Same  Industry   -0.009  -0.011 
   (-0.33)  (-0.42) 
Year  Dummies  yes yes yes yes 
Country  Dummies  yes yes yes yes 
Observations  2332 1530 2331 1529 








   42
Table 8 Target vs acquirer in domestic and cross-border M&As. Dependent variable is equal to one if the 
merging firm is the acquirer and to zero if the firm is the target. The sample include deals in which both target and acquirer are 
public. Panel A contains domestic mergers only while Panel B examines cross-border mergers. First two columns in each panel 
use the firm-level stock returns in $US (Firm USR12). Last two columns of each panel decompose firm-level stock returns in 
$US into 3 parts: market returns in local currency (Market R12), currency returns (Currency R12), and firm residual stock returns 
in local currency (Firm USR12-Market R12-Currency R12).  Marginal effects are reported. Standard errors are robust. 
 
   Domestic Deals       Cross-border Deals 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4)    (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Firm USR12  0.049*** 0.055***        0.062***  0.064**     
 (3.96)  (3.95)        (2.72)  (2.38)     
Market  R12              0.098  0.099 
              (1.16)  (1.09) 
Currency  R12              0.108  -0.192 
              (0.48)  (-0.80) 
Firm USR12-Market R12-Currency R12      0.050***  0.056***        0.059**  0.064** 
     (3.91)  (3.90)        (2.48)  (2.35) 
Log  Firm  Size  0.122*** 0.136*** 0.121*** 0.136***  0.132*** 0.140*** 0.132*** 0.141*** 
  (22.37)  (20.91) (22.38) (20.91)    (14.67) (12.46) (14.60) (12.48) 
Long-term Debt/Asset    0.027    0.027      0.180    0.181 
    (0.36)  (0.36)     (1.08)  (1.09) 
Cash/Asset   0.225***    0.222***      0.318***    0.316*** 
    (3.59)  (3.54)     (2.81)  (2.79) 
Sales growth (2-year)    0.004    0.004      0.019    0.020 
    (0.93)  (0.92)     (1.42)  (1.45) 
Return on Equity    0.126***    0.124***      0.334***    0.335*** 
    (2.99)  (2.95)     (3.92)  (3.99) 
Year  Dummies  Yes  Yes Yes Yes     Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country  Dummies  Yes  Yes Yes Yes    Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  3625  3262  3625  3262  1304  1178  1302  1176 
Pseudo  R-square  0.145  0.171 0.145 0.171      0.271 0.320 0.271 0.321 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  